# Babism, Baha'ism and the Ulama

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Hamid Algar, Babism, Baha'ism and the Ulama, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969, bahai-library.com.
> ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
> 
> The Role of
> the Ulama in the
> Qajar Period
> by
> HAMID ALGAR
> 
> UNI VERSI TY OF C A L I F OR NI A PRESS
> BERKELEY, LOS ANGELES, LONDON
> University of C alifornia Press
> Berkeley and Los Angeles, California
> University of California Press, Ltd.
> London, England
> Copyright ©1969 by T he Regents of the University of California
> C alifornia Library R eprint Series Edition, 1980
> ISBN 0-520-04100-3
> Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-79959
> Designed by W. H. Snyder
> Printed in the U nited States of America
> 
> 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
> Contents
> 
> A Note on the Sources______________________________xi
> Abbreviations___________________________________ xvii
> I The                                                 _l
> II The Eve of Qajar Rule                                26
> III The Clerical Policy of Fath ‘All Shah                45
> IV ‘Abbâs Mïrzâ, Qâ’im Maqâm, and the Ulama              73
> V The Ulama and the Early Foreign Impact                82
> VI T h e R eig n o f M uham m ad Shah                   103
> VII TheJFirst Four Years of Nâsir ud-Dfn Shah’s Reign and
> the Ministry of Mïrzâ Taqï Khân Amir Kabïr
> (1264/1848-1268/1851)                                 122
> VIII Bâbism, Bahà’is    and the Ulama
> IX Between Two Reformers, Mïrzâ Taqï Khân Amïr
> Kabïr and Mïrzâ Husayn^Khân Sipahsâlàr (1268/
> 1851-1288/1871)                                      152
> VIII
> 
> Bâbism, Bahâ’ism,
> and the Ulama
> 
> The rise of Bâbism and its successor Bahâ’ism was swift and ac­
> companied by much bloodshed; it seemed at least initially to be
> of great importance for the history of Iran, and even, it was
> thought, for the whole of the Middle East. As such, it has received
> much attention, and several attempts at interpretation have been
> made. In these, the reaction of the ulama to the appearance of
> Bâbism has not been closely studied. It was, however, the ulama
> who formulated the most explicit reaction to Bâbism and its
> claims, and in this case as in others we see the ulama functioning
> as de facto leaders of the nation, concerned on this occasion to
> preserve its religious uniformity. Both Bâbïs and Bahâ’ïs recog­
> nized the ulama as among their chief adversaries, and this recogni­
> tion was expressed in word and deed.
> That this should be so was perhaps inevitable. Bâbism, at all
> stages of its doctrinal development, was of necessity opposed to
> Islam, for its claim to validity presupposed the supersession of Is­
> lam. The coming of a new revelation would have destroyed the
> worth of the existing one, which regarded itself as final. The ulama,
> on the other hand, were the institutional expression of the power
> 138                                         Religion and State in Iran
> of Islam, the expositors and guardians of its doctrine and the en­
> forcers of its law, and among their functions was the rebuttal of
> heresy and innovation.
> The sources for the history of Bâbism are opposed in emotional
> and religious emphasis; yet if Bàbï accounts are stripped of their
> hagiographical elements, and state chronicles of their polemical
> fervor, a fairly reliable narrative can be established. It is clear that
> when Sayyid ‘Alï Muhammad, in 1259/1843, first claimed to be the
> Bab, the “gateway” to the Hidden Imam, he clashed immediately
> with the ulama. One of the earliest writers on the history of
> Bâbism, Comte Arthur de Gobineau, suggests that anticlerical
> themes formed a large part of his early preaching, and that their
> acceptability was an important element in the earliest conversions
> to the new faith.1 More significant a cause for the hostility of the
> ulama to the Báb was doubtless provided by the realization that
> his doctrines constituted biďat, i.e., reprehensible innovation in
> matters of faith. Mullâ ‘Alï Akbar Ardistànï, one of the early con­
> verts, appended to the idhân (call to prayer) he proclaimed from
> the mosque of Àqâ Qàsim in Shiraz: “I bear witness that ‘Alï Mu­
> hammad is the ‘remnant’ (baqiya) of God.”2
> The governor of Shiraz, Husayn Khàn Nizàm ud-Daula (also
> entitled Âjüdànbàshï) had been absent from the town. After his
> return, the ulama persuaded him, on Sha'bân 16/September 11, to
> punish Mullâ ‘Alï Akbar, Mullâ Muhammad Sâdiq, and other
> followers of the Bâb.3 Some were whipped, others, such as Muham­
> mad ‘Alï Bârfurüshï, were paraded around the bazaar with black­
> ened faces and burnt beards.4 On Ramadán 15/October 9, Sayyid
> ‘Alï Muhammad was brought to Shiraz from Bushire, where he had
> first publicly announced his claims. In Shiraz, he was confronted
> for the first time with the ulama.5 Accounts given of this confron­
> tation by sources hostile to the Bâb contain two elements recur­
> ring in later interrogations—his deficient knowledge of Arabic and
> 1 A. de Gobineau, Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l’Asie Centrale
> (Paris, 1865), pp. 148-149.
> 2 E. G. Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd or New History of Mïrzâ ‘Alï Muhammad
> the Bâb (Cambridge, 1893), p. 200. According to Khan Bahadur Agha Mirza
> Muhammad (“Some New Notes on Bâbism," JRAS, n.v. [July 1927], 451), Mullâ
> Muhammad Sâdiq was the first to proclaim this deformed idhân.
> 3 Browne, ed., op. cit., p. 200; RSN, X, 311; MN, III, 184.
> 4 E. G. Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, Written To Illustrate the Episode
> of the Bab (Cambridge, 1891), II, 7.
> 5 MN, III, 185; RSN, X, 311.
> Bàbism, Bahà’ism, and the Ulama                                          139
> the traditional religious sciences, and his recantation.6 While it is
> legitimate to question the accuracy of these accounts, and details
> may have been invented or emphasized to discredit the Bâb, the
> silence of Bàbï sources on the course of the confrontations suggests
> that the Bâb was in fact worsted by the ulama in debate. The con­
> frontations demonstrate the role of the ulama in refuting Bàbism:
> by employing that scholastic knowledge which was one of their
> chief qualifications, they questioned the legitimacy of his claims;
> and by accepting his recantation, visibly asserted their own author­
> ity. At the end of his interrogation, the Bab was beaten and then
> conducted by ‘Abd ul-Hamïd Khàn Kalàntar to the Masjid-i
> Vakil, where he publicly repeated his recantation.7 Bàbï accounts
> agree that a meeting between the Bâb and the ulama took place,
> without offering any detail, and that it was attended by Sayyid
> Yahyà Dàrâbï, who was subsequently to lead the Bàbï insurrection
> at Nayrlz.8
> Although thus far Husayn Kliàn Nizàm ud-Daula appears to
> have acted in cooperation with the ulama, differing approaches by
> the state and the ulama to the problem of Bàbism can be detected.
> According to Gobineau, both the ulama of Shiraz and Husayn
> Khàn wrote to Tehran explaining the situation; and their example
> was followed by the Bâb.9 It seems entirely possible that at this
> stage the Bàb hoped to secure his position by winning the support
> of Muhammad Shàh and his minister. Even when imprisoned in
> Màkü, the Bàb still considered it worth his while to compose a
> risàla dedicated to Hàjjï Mïrzà Àqàsï.10 Although Bàbï political
> theory left little room for the exercise of regal power,11 Sayyid ‘AH
> Muhammad may have sought to make use of the conflict between
> ulama and state by presenting himself as an instrument for the
> destruction of clerical power. Gobineau writes that he asked for
> permission to come to Tehran, and that Hàjjï Mïrzà Àqàsï was
> 
> « M N , I I I , 184.
> 7  Muhammad, op. cit., pp. 452-454. According to this account, the Bâb was
> interrogated twice by the ulama in Shiraz, the second meeting being caused
> by the rashness of his followers. If this is so, we see here already how the
> development of Bàbism as a movement of revolt proceeded more or less inde­
> pendently of the Bâb and his pronouncements.
> 8 Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadîd, p. 203; Browne, ed.. Traveller's Narrative,
> I, 10.
> 9 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 151.
> 10 Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 274.
> 11 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 335.
> 140                                            Religion and State in Iran
> initially disposed to let him come.12 One of such heterodox outlook
> as Hâjjï Mïrzâ Àqàsî can scarcely have been scandalized by the
> Bab's claims; more probably he hoped for some amusement from
> the spectacle of the Bab’s clash with the ulama, and even for an
> amount of support in his own constant struggle with the clerical
> class. The opposition of Shaykh ‘Abd ul-Husayn Mujtahid forced
> him to change his intentions. He pointed out that if the ulama
> were to be obliged to defend themselves against the government
> and the Bab, they were capable of doing so.13 As in the case of the
> demand for war against the Ottoman Empire, Hájil Mïrzâ Âqâsï
> appears to have made all unavoidable outward concessions, while
> being careful not to encourage the expression of clerical power.
> He sent orders to Husayn Khân prohibiting further discussion be­
> tween the Bâb and the people of Shiraz.14 The Bâb was confined
> to his house, but evidently his confinement was not strict, for it was
> in Shiraz that Mullâ Husayn Bushravayh, on his way from Arab
> Iraq to Kirman, accepted the Bab’s claims.15 He it was who, on be­
> ing converted, organized the insurrections in Khurasan and Ma-
> zandaran. Thus far-reaching were the consequences of the Bab’s
> residence in Shiraz. The ulama protested against the inefficacy of
> his confinement, but without success.16 The danger of Bâbism, not
> only to orthodoxy but also to the state, was not yet apparent. The
> failure to isolate the Bâb completely represented not only the
> customary inefficiency of the administration, but also its indiffer­
> ence to the support of orthodoxy. The ulama, for their part, al­
> though dissatisfied with the laxity of the measures taken against
> the Bâb, do not yet appear to have demanded his death.17 The
> imâm jum‘a of Shiraz considered his release from prison permissi­
> ble if he recanted;18 and others of the ulama considered the Bâb in­
> sane and therefore neither responsible for his words, nor liable to
> the punishment they would otherwise bring him.19 Despite all this,
> 
> 12 Ibid., p. 153.
> 13 Ibid., p. 154.
> 14 Ibid., p. 155.
> 15 Ibid., p. 157.
> 16 Ibid., p. 155.
> 17 The Traveller's Narrative (ed. Browne, I, 7, 14) claims that the ulama of
> Shiraz issued a fatvâ for the killing of the Bâb. It should be remembered that
> the Bahâ’ï histories lay great emphasis on the role of the ulama. This is largely
> justified; but in this case events appear to have been anticipated.
> 18 Muhammad, op. cit., p. 453.
> 19 RSN, X, 311.
> Bàbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                                                        141
> an ambiguity in the attitude of the state is observable, and the ulti­
> mate execution of the Bab was preceded by several fatvâs declaring
> him deserving of death.20
> Mullâ Husayn Bushravayh, on his way from Shiraz to Khurasan,
> had passed through Isfahan and informed the governor, Manü-
> chihr Khàn Mu'tamad ud-Daula, of the appearance of the Bab.21
> Both Bábi and other Persian sources agree that Manüchihr Khân
> was favorably inclined to the Bab and had him brought to Isfahan
> to satisfy his personal curiosity.22 With Manüchihr Khân, the iden­
> tification of the Bab with the state almost became a reality. In
> order, presumably, to conceal his inclinations and to nullify any
> possible agitation, Manüchihr Khân caused the Bâb to be accom­
> modated in the residence of the imâm jum'a, and after a period of
> forty days, to be publicly confronted with the ulama of Isfahan,
> gathered in the Masjid-i Shâh.23 It is clear that the ulama suspected
> the nature of Manüchihr Khân’s intentions. By again confronting
> the Bâb with the ulama, he may have hoped to erase the impression
> left by his experience in Shiraz, or at least to provide a pretext for
> postponing any final decision. Most of the ulama refused to attend
> the confrontation saying that as the incompatibility of the Bâb’s
> pretensions with the shari'at was “clearer and brighter than the
> sun,” any further discussion was superfluous, and all that remained
> to be done was to enforce the relevant provision of the law.24 This
> appears to have been the first clear demand by the ulama for the
> execution of the Bâb. Only the imâm jum'a, Àqâ Mir Muhammad
> Mihdl, and Mïrzâ Hasan Nürï, son of Mullâ ‘Alï Nürï, attended
> 
> 20 A. K. S. Lambton (“Persian Society under the Qajars,” JRCAS, XLVIII
> [1961], 136) writes that in Qajar times as earlier, movements of social revolt
> tended to take on a religious coloring “because orthodoxy was associated with
> the ruling institution,” and that “because there was no separation between
> Church and State, unorthodoxy was almost automatically regarded as a threat
> to the existing régime”; and cites Bâbism as the chief example. We have al­
> ready noted, however, the alienation of the ulama from the state; and in the
> case of B â b ism , th e d a n g e r w as in itia lly o n ly to o r th o d o x y . T h e s ta te re a c te d
> seriously only when its own security was affected. The most significant move­
> ments of social revolt in the Qajar period took place precisely within an
> “orthodox” frame of expression, drawing on a long tradition in so doing.
> 21 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 15.
> 22 Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 15; Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd, p. 208; RSN, X,
> 312; N T , p. 426; MN, III, 185. The last three imply that Manüchihr Khàn was
> deceived as to the nature of the Bab’s claims.
> 23 Browne, ed.. Traveller’s Narrative, II, 16; Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadid, p.
> 210.
> 24 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 16.
> 142                                           Religion and State in Iran
> the meeting in the Masjid-i Shah.25 Mïr Muhammad Mihdï
> inquired of the Báb what was the source of his certainty, for
> after the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, certain knowledge on
> any point of religious law was to be had only by a pronounce­
> ment of the Hidden Imam, vouchsafed in a vision. Mïrzà Hasan
> Nürï asked him to describe the circumference of the earth, since
> the knowledge of this, among other matters, was a sign of the
> Mahdi.26 Both questions he was unable to answer, and the meet­
> ing was dissolved without conclusive result.27 Manüchihr Khan
> protected the Báb until his death, and again the Báb appears
> to have had enough freedom to maintain and even expand contact
> with his followers.28 The ulama protested to Hàjjï Mïrzà Àqàsï,
> but received only a noncommittal reply.29
> On the death of Manüchihr Khân in 1263/1847, Hàjjï Mïrzà
> Âqàsï gave orders that the Bàb be brought to Tehran.30 According
> to the Traveller’s Narrative, the Bàb, when a few stages distant
> from Tehran, wrote a letter to Muhammad Shâh, asking to be
> granted an audience.31 Hàjjï Mïrzà Àqàsï, anxious neither to
> arouse the opposition of the ulama, nor to give them an oppor­
> tunity of asserting themselves, refused his consent.32 Instead the
> Bàb was sent in chains to be imprisoned at Màkü in Azerbayjan.
> En route, he spent forty days in Tabriz, but the ulama refused to
> meet him.33 From Màkü, he was transferred to the fortress at Chih-
> rïq near the Ottoman border. Here again he appears to have been
> able to maintain contact with his disciples, who were by now en­
> gaged in revolt in Mazandaran.34 The disquiet caused by the Bàbï
> uprisings, together with the continuing agitation of the ulama, led
> Hàjjï Mïrzà Àqàsï, three months after the Bàb had been brought
> to Chihrïq, to have recourse again to the device of a confrontation,
> one little more conclusive that the preceding ones in Shiraz and
> 25 Ibid., II, 17.
> 2 6 N T , p. 427. The Târïkh-i-Jadïd (Browne, ed., p. 209) claims that Mir
> Muhammad Mihdï accepted the claims of the Bâb.
> 2 7 N T , p. 428.
> 28 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 15.
> 2 9 Text given in Ahmad Kasravï, Bahâ’ïgarï (Tehran, n.d,). p. 26; Firïdün
> Âdamïyat, Amir Kabïr va Iran (Tehran, 1334 Sh/1955), p. 202.
> 3 0 Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 18.
> 31 Ibid., II, 20.
> 32 Ibid., II, 19. There may be some truth in the suggestion that Hàjjï Mïrzà
> Âqâsï was afraid of Muhammad Shah transferring his spiritual loyalties to the
> Bâb. See Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 21.
> 33 Ibid., II, 22.
> 34 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 274.
> Bâbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                               1 4   3
> 
> Isfahan. The Traveller’s Narrative represents Hàjjï Mïrzâ Àqàsï
> as being still reluctant to conform with the wishes of the ulama;35
> but on this occasion, the ulama of Tabriz, hoping possibly for a
> definitive solution of the problem, consented to meet the Bab in
> the presence of Nâsir ud-Dïn Mïrzâ, at the time heir apparent and
> governor of Azerbayjan. The Bâb was brought from Chihriq by
> Sulaymàn Khàn Afshàr, and the day after his arrival in Tabriz was
> interrogated by Mullà Muhammad Mamaqànï, chief of the Shay-
> khï ulama of Tabriz;36 Hàjjï Mullà Mahmüd Nizàm ul-‘Ulamà;37
> Mïrzâ ‘Alï Asghar Shaykh ul-Islàm; Mïrzâ Ahmad Mujtahid Imàm
> Jum'a; and Hàjjï Murtadà Qulï Marandï.38 Various questions
> were put to the Bàb, concerning Arabie grammar and syntax, and
> the signs traditionally associated with the coming of the Hidden
> Imam.39 Unable to answer them, he again recanted, and after being
> beaten by the shaykh ul-Islàm in person, was sent back to
> Chihrïq.40 Still, then, the Bàb was left alive; and it was only when
> Amïr Kabïr thought the state endangered that the penalty for
> apostasy was applied. Religious duty had to wait on the state for
> its fulfillment. The episode of the Bâb provided one of the clearest
> examples of the dependence of shar‘ law on the state for the execu­
> tion of its judgments. The shaykh ul-Islàm of Tabriz wrote to the
> Bàb that only doubts concerning his sanity prevented his immedi­
> ate execution,41 but it is difficult to see in what manner these doubts
> 
> 35   Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 25.
> 3 6 Nadir Mïrzâ, Târïkh va Jughrâfï-yi Dâr us-Saltana-yi Tabriz (Tehran,
> 
> 1323 Q/»9°5). P- n 7-
> 37 Mullà Mahmüd was tutor to Nâsir ud-Dïn, and when his pupil mounted
> the throne, he occupied a position of some importance at court. See below,
> p. 160.
> 38 Browne, ed., op. cit., II, 20; Browne, ed., Târikh-i-Jadïd, p. 285; Kasravï,
> op. cit., p. 29; RSN, X, 423; N T, p. 470. According to the Târïkh-i-Jadïd, the
> Bâb was lodged in the house of Mïrzâ Ahmad; according to N T, in that of
> Kâzim Khân Farrâshbâshï.
> 39 The substance of this examination of the Bàb is not seriously disputed by
> either the Traveller’s Narrative or the Târikh-i-Jadïd, both Bahâ’ï sources.
> Ridâ Qulï Khân claims to base his account on the information of Hàjjï Mullà
> Mahmüd (RSN, X, 423). Together with the versions given in Q‘U (p. 46) and
> N T (pp. 470-472), it corresponds in detail with the report sent to Tehran
> by Nâsir ud-Dïn Mïrzâ (original in Majlis library, Tehran; text reproduced by
> Âdamïyat, [op. cit., p. 202], Kasravï, [op. cit., pp. 30-32] and E. G. Browne
> [Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 253-256]).
> 40 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 27; Browne, ed., Târîkh-i Jadid,
> p. 290.
> 41 Kasravï, op. cit., p. 34. The fact that the Bâb was a sayyid (Gobineau [op.
> cit., p. 143] considers his claim weak) may have been a further cause for delaying
> his execution, and also for choosing Armenian troops to shoot him.
> *44                                           Religion and State in Iran
> were dispelled before the execution of the Bàb in 1266/1849. On
> the other hand, the threat posed to secular authority became ever
> clearer.
> Mullà Husayn Bushravayh had gone from Shiraz by way of
> Tehran to Khurasan, and there attempted to secure acceptance of
> the Bab’s claims. He met with partial success in Nayshapur, and
> then moved to Mashhad, where in the last years of Muhammad
> Shah’s reign, the Sàlàr and Hamza Mïrzà Hishmat ud-Daula were
> struggling for the possession of the town.42 However, Mullà
> Husayn was repulsed by both of them, and Hamza Mïrzà impris­
> oned him at the bidding of the ulama.43 Escaping, he moved in the
> direction of Sabzavar, where he and his followers were armed by a
> certain Mïrzà Taqï Juvaynï.44 At this point, the rebellion against
> the state began. This fact was obscured by the death of Muhammad
> Shàh, and the Bàbï revolt became one element in the chaos sur­
> rounding the succession. Mullà Husayn, together with Mullà
> Muhammad ‘Alï Bàrfurüshï and Qurrat ul-‘Ayn, moved into
> Mazandaran, and here the first battles between Bàbism and the
> state took place. The immediate threat was, however, to the ulama,
> just as the claims of the Bàb appeared initially to endanger only
> religion. The ulama of Bârfurüsh (modern Bàbul) were threatened
> by Mullà Muhammad ‘AH who marched through the streets of the
> town at the head of three hundred men with drawn swords: “le
> clergé jugea qu’il était grandement temps d’engager la lutte si l’on
> ne voulait pas courir le risque d’être un plus peu tard anéanti sans
> combat.”45 Sa'ïd ul-‘Ulamâ Bàrfurüshï led the resistance to the
> Bàbïs, constantly pleading for troops to be sent against them.46
> Nàsir ud-Dïn Shah was preparing to leave for Tehran, and evi­
> dently the matter was thought too trivial to warrant serious atten­
> tion.47 At the request of Sa'ïd ul-‘Ulamà, however, ‘Abbàs Qulï
> Khàn, governor of Làrïjàn,sent three hundred troops to Bârfurüsh,
> 
> 42 See above, p. 125.
> 4 3 N T , p. 473; RSN, X, 422; Gobineau, op. cit., p. 171.
> 44 Ibid., p. 173.
> 45 Ibid., p. 185.
> 46 Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd, p. 52. The same work (p. 91) claims that
> Sa'ïd ul-'Ulamâ’ was a Jewish convert to Islam, implying, perhaps, that his re­
> sistance to Bâbism was inspired by the enthusiasm of a proselyte. The short
> biographical notice of Sa'ïd ul-'Ulamâ’ in Mïrzà Muhammad Hasan Khan
> I'timâd us-Saltana, al-Ma’athir va-1-Âthâr (Tehran, 1306 Q/1889, p. 150) makes
> no mention of any Jewish origin.
> 4 7 Muhammad, op. cit., p. 457.
> Bàbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                               *   4   5
> 
> and Mullà Husayn and his followers withdrew from the town.48
> There then followed the siege of the Bâbï stronghold at Shaykh
> Tabarsl. In the course of the repeated defeats suffered by govern­
> ment troops, Sa'ïd ul-'Ulamà exhorted them constantly to persist
> against the Bâbîs; when ultimately Shaykh Tabarsl fell, he exe­
> cuted some of the survivors with his own hands in the marketplace
> at Bàrfurüsh.49 As the most important of the ulama of Mazan-
> daran, he thus played a central role in combating Bàbism.
> Whereas the Bâbîs in Mazandaran established themselves in a
> stronghold at some distance from the main towns of the region, the
> insurrection in Zanjàn was a more direct challenge to govern­
> mental authority. There it was led by Mullà Muhammad Zanjànï,
> who before adopting Bàbism had followed the Akhbârï madhhab.
> It appears that even before his conversion to Bàbism, he had con­
> stantly been in dispute with both state and ulama.50 When visiting
> the governor of Zanjàn, he was always accompanied by a group of
> armed followers.51 His disputes with the Usülï ulama of Zanjân
> became so acrimonious that they wrote to Tehran requesting his
> removal from the town.52 He was banished on several occasions; it
> was on one of these, toward the end of the reign of Muhammad
> Shâh, that he met Mullà Husayn Bushravayh in Tehran.53 In the
> confusion following the death of Muhammad Shàh and the fall
> from power of Hàjjï Mïrzâ Âqàsî, he returned to Zanjàn, where he
> was enthusiastically received by his former followers.54 He pro­
> claimed that he had become a Bàbï, and his followers decided also
> to adopt the new faith. Initially, his violence was directed only
> against the ulama; a Bahâ’ï source records that a mullà was
> dragged down from his minhar (pulpit),55 and the son of the
> shaykh ul-Islàm was murdered.56 The ulama informed the capital
> 48 Gobineau, op. cit., pp. 186-187.
> 49 Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd, pp. 58, 72, 88; RSN, X, 446.
> 50 Gobineau (op. cit., p. 233) writes: “A s’en faire une idée tout a fait im­
> partiale, on peut voir en lui un de ces nombreux musulmans qui, au vrai, ne le
> sont pas du tout, mais que pressent un fond très ample et très vivace de foi et de
> zèle religieux dont ils cherchent remploi avec passion.” The analysis does not,
> however, give an immediate impression of impartiality.
> 51 RSN, X, 448.
> 52 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 234; Browne, ed.. Traveller’s Narrative, II, p. 13;
> Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadid, p. 135.
> 53 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 12.
> 54 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 235.
> 55 Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadid, p. 371.
> 56 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 238.
> 146                                            Religion and State in Iran
> of what was happening, but it was not until one of the Bàbïs was
> arrested that fighting broke out. He was arrested for nonpayment
> of fiscal arrears, and Mullà Muhammad ‘All attempted to free him
> by force.57 Although the insurrection was in the name of Bâbism
> and was pursued with great ferocity, we see here a repetition of one
> of the traditional motives for movements of disobedience led by
> the ulama: in particular it may be compared with the rising of
> 1253/1837—1838 in Isfahan.58 One of the many motives that led to
> the dissemination of Bâbism was thus the readiness of a devoted
> following to obey the directives of a mullà, even after his conver­
> sion to Bâbism. Here, one aspect of clerical power is reflected in
> Bâbism; but the case of Zanjàn, with the exception of that of
> Nayrïz, is isolated.
> Sayyid Yahyà Dàrâbï, as mentioned above, attended the first in­
> terrogation of the Bàb in Shiràz, doing so, according to Bahà’î
> sources, on behalf of Muhammad Shàh.59 From Shiraz he had gone
> to Yazd, whence he was expelled for preaching Bâbism in 1850.60
> Reaching Nayrïz, he enclosed himself in the citadel from which he
> was driven after a prolonged siege.61 His father, Sayyid Ja'far, had
> enjoyed wide popularity which was transferred to him, while a
> dispute between the townspeople and their governor, Mïrzà Zayn
> ul'Abidln, supplied an additional reason to welcome him.62 Here
> again it is evident that loyalty to the person of a powerful mullà
> survived his conversion to Bâbism, when he fulfilled the traditional
> role of opposition to the oppression of the governor. The Tdrlkh-i-
> Jadïd confirms that Sayyid Yahyâ relied on the faithfulness of his
> father’s followers.63
> The insurrection in Zanjàn at last decided Amir Kabïr to do
> away with the Bàb, as ultimate source of the unrest.64 Again he was
> brought from Chihriq to Tabriz, and fatvàs were delivered by
> 57  Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd, p. 140; Gobineau, op. cit., p. 238.
> 58 See above, pp. 111-112.
> 5 9 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 10; Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd,
> p. 113.
> 60 Browne, ed., Traveller’s Narrative, II, 254.
> 61 Ibid., p. 254.
> 62 RSN, X, 457.
> 63 p. u8. See, too, Muhammad, op. cit., p. 466. It is questionable how well the
> participants in Bâbï-led revolts were acquainted with Bábi tenets. Browne
> (introduction to Târïkh-i-Jadïd, p. xxvii )points out that the devotion of the
> Bâbïs was, in general, more to leaders than to books and precepts.
> 64 RSN, X, 456. The Târïkh-i-Jadïd (p. 292) bears witness to Amir Kabir’s
> reluctance, and to his being motivated solely by reasons of state.
> Bâbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                               *47
> 
> various of the ulama condemning him to death. The Traveller’s
> Narrative mentions Mullâ Muhammad Mamaqânï, Mïrzâ Bàqir
> Mujtahid, and Mullâ Murtadà Qulï Marandï.65 At last, the state
> decided to enforce the penalty for apostasy; but the offense caus­
> ing it to do so was one in nature less religious, and more directly
> threatening itself. On Sha'bân 27, 1266/July 8, 1850, the Bàb was
> shot dead in the citadel of Tabriz.66
> This ended the first stage in the development of the religious
> movement resulting in the syncretist doctrines of Bahâ’ism.67 It
> was the ulama who were first threatened by it and often suffered
> from its violence. In Qazvin, Hâjjï Mullâ Muhammad Taqï Burg-
> hânï was killed in the mihrâb (niche) of a mosque by Mïrzâ Çâlih
> Shîrâzï for his persistent denunciation of Bâbism.68 The Bâb him­
> self, though largely remote from the activities of his followers, indi­
> cated his attitude to the ulama by breaking a stick over the chief
> mullâ of Mâkü.69 Furthermore, it was the ulama who throughout
> encouraged the state to suppress the movement, and their resis­
> tance to it was more consistent than that of either Hâjjï Mïrzâ
> Àqâsï or Amïr Kabïr. Their function of defending the religio-
> national community was, then, again exemplified in the struggle
> against Bâbism, while in this struggle the role of the state appeared
> to them, at best, as lacking in enthusiasm and, at worst, as
> ambiguous.
> It is, nonetheless, necessary to recall that many of the leading
> Bâbïs were drawn from the ulama, though only one mujtahid, Aqâ
> Sayyid Husayn Turshïzï, appears to have joined their ranks.70 The
> majority of these were Shaykhïs, and in the light of the expecta­
> tions implicit in Shaykhï teaching, their conversion is not remark­
> able.71 We have seen that, on the other hand, Mullâ Muhammad
> ‘Ali Zanjânï was an Akhbârï before his conversion, but it appears
> possible that he was attracted above all by the insurrectionary as-
> 65  II, 55. Gobineau (op. cit., p. 260) says that another discussion between the
> ulama and the Bâb was provided for, which most of them refused to attend. It
> is probable, however, that he is confusing these events with the earlier bringing
> of the Bâb from Chihriq.
> 66 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 263; N T , p. 489.
> 67 It is arguable that the movement began with Shaykh Ahmad Ahsâ’î, or
> even earlier. See Kasravl, op. cit., pp. 2-20.
> 68 Q‘U, p. 22.
> 69 Browne, ed., Târïkh-i-Jadïd, p. 352.
> 70 Browne, ed., Traveller's Narrative, II, 212.
> 71 A list of some Shaykhï mullâs who accepted Bâbism is given in ibid.,
> p. 6.
> ij 8                                           Religion and State in Iran
> pects of the new faith. The Târikh-i-Jadid estimates the number of
> ulama to have accepted Bâbism at 400, and claims that they occupy
> “the position of a touchstone or measure for the proving of his [the
> Bab’s] claims, which distinguishes base metal from true.”72 That
> indeed the vast majority of the ulama rejected the Bab’s claims was
> probably the most important single factor working against their
> acceptance. Had the Bab in fact been acknowledged as the Hidden
> Imam, the function of the ulama would have ceased to exist. It
> may be conceded that they thus had a vested interest in the con­
> tinued occultation of the Hidden Imam; but even Baha’is realized
> that the ulama had only two possible courses of action: to reject as
> false the Shi'i traditions considering the manner of the appearance
> of the Hidden Imam, or to consider the Bab a blasphemous
> apostate.73
> Bâbism had certain consequences for the ulama and for Iran as
> a whole, many of which are suggested by a comparison with
> Ismà'îlism. The comparison was made in the Qajar period and has
> been repeated by later investigators.74 Both Ismà'îlism and Bâbism
> were heresies of Shi'ite origin seeking to overthrow orthodoxy
> (Sunni and Ithnâ'asharï respectively) by violence, and spreading
> their doctrines by secret instruction.75 Doctrinally, too, there were
> similarities: the title of Bâb was given in Ismà'îlism to one of the
> seven grades of the esoteric hierarchy.76 The Bâbîs for their part
> revived the mystic use of the numeral seven with the theory of the
> seven letters (hurüf) by means of which God accomplished the task
> of creation.77As Bàbï-Bahà’ï doctrine lost its Shi'ite tinge, it tended
> to attract the religious minorities, particularly the Zoroastrians78
> 72 pp. 231-235.
> 73 Browne, ed.. Traveller’s Narrative, II, 32.
> 74 Q‘U, p. 46; article on Bâbism by Jamâl ud-Dïn Asadâbâdî in Dâ’irat al-
> Ma’ârif, ed. Butrus Bustânî (Beirut, 1881), V, 26; Jamâl ud-Dïn Asadâbâdî,
> “Radd-i Naycharïya," in Ârâ va Mu‘taqadàt-i Sayyid Jamâl ud-Dïn-i Afghani,
> ed. M. Chahârdihï (Tehran, 1337 Sh/1958), p. 49; ‘Abd ar-Razzâq al-Hasanï,
> al-Bâbiyün wa-l-Bahâ’ïyùn fi Hâdirihim xva Mâdïhim (Sidon, 1376 Q/1956-
> 1957), p. 10; G. Scarcia, "A Proposito del Problema della Sovranità presso gli
> Imamiti,” Annali del Istituto Orientale di Napoli, VII (1957), 121 (Bâbism a
> *‘neo-Ismâ‘ïlï interpretation of Shaykhi Imâmism”).
> 75 On Ismâ'ilï use of violence, see Marshall G. Hodgson, The Order of Assas­
> sins (’s-Gravenhage, 1955), pp. 110-115.
> 76 H. Corbin, Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique (Paris, 1963), p. 131.
> 77 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 314. No complete analysis of the doctrines of Bâbism
> and its successors is attempted here.
> 78 E. G. Browne, A Year amongst the Persians (new ed., London, 1950), p. 430.
> Bâbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                         149
> in much the same way as Ismà'ïlism had proclaimed “interconfes-
> sionalism” in its attempts to subvert orthodoxy.79 The threats pre­
> sented by Bâbism and Ismâ'ïlism, being both pervasive and hidden
> in their nature, permitted accusations of allegiance to heresy to
> become means of controversy and enmity. This was particularly
> the case with Bâbism, after the attempted assassination of Nâsir
> ul-Dïn Shâh.80
> Taqïya, the prudent concealment of belief in circumstances of
> danger, was both a cause and a result of this pervasive fear and
> suspicion. The original justification of taqïya, self-protection from
> Sunni intolerance, had virtually ceased to exist,81 but the habits
> of concealment and ambiguity it engendered lived on. Many of the
> Bâbïs who remained in Iran found themselves obliged to practice
> taqïya, as the violence of the early Bâbïs was paid back to their
> successors by the ulama and the state. Taqïya at the same time en­
> abled them to continue in, or penetrate, the ranks of the ulama,
> and the discontent of Bahâ’ïs and Azalïs added a further element
> to the opposition to the Qajar monarchy, one that became en­
> twined with the ulama themselves.
> Probably the emergence of Bâbism affected the Shaykhïs more
> than other sections of the ulama, and taqïya was in practice forced
> on them too. The process had started when Sayyid Kâzim Rashtï,
> successor to Shaykh Ahmad Ahsâ’ï as leader of the sect, was obliged
> to confess that the apparent meaning of certain of Shaykh Ahmad’s
> doctrines constituted misbelief.82 On the death of Sayyid Kâzim,
> not only the Bâb, but two other rival successors emerged, both
> hostile to the pretensions of Sayyid ‘Alï Muhammad.83 Mullâ
> Muhammad Mamaqânï, a follower of Mirzâ ShafT Tabrïzï, one
> of the claimants to the succession, was among the ulama who con­
> demned the Bâb to death in Tabriz. Hâjjï Muhammad Karim
> Khân, the other claimant, was not less decisive in his reaction to
> Bâbism. In Kirman, he gave a fatvâ for the killing of two Bâbï
> missionaries.84 He wrote a treatise refuting the Bab’s claims, al­
> legedly at the request of Nâsir ud-Dïn Shâh, but more probably to
> 
> 79 B. Lewis, The Origins of Ismâ'ïlism (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 93-96.
> 80 Gobineau, op. cit., p. 304.
> 81 See below, p. 228.
> 82 Q T, p. 31.
> 88 Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
> 84 Browne, ed., Târikh-i-Jadïd, p. 200.
> 150                                            Religion and State in Iran
> establish a distance between himself and the Báb.85 In his treatise
> Si Fa$l, he later claimed that, far from suffering from Bàbï inclina­
> tions, he was the first to pronounce the Bab an infidel.86 It is clear
> that a certain similarity existed between the initial claims of the
> Báb and the Shaykhï concept of the shVa-yi kámil (the perfect shi'a)
> as human intermediaries between the community of believers and
> the Hidden Imam. Therefore, the followers of Hàjjï Muhammad
> Karim Khan found it prudent to reexplain the concept as no more
> than an idea, not to be identified with any one person.878When he
> wrote a treatise summarizing Shaykhï beliefs, significantly such
> typical Shaykhï concepts as the jism-i hürqalïyâ’ï88 received no
> mention.89 A successor of Hàjjï Muhammad Karim Khan even
> went so far as to suggest that the differences between Usülïs and
> Shaykhïs were purely terminological.90 Thus did the emergence of
> Bàbism force one section of the ulama to resort to taqïya in its
> struggle with the majority. This struggle, though secondary to that
> between ulama and state, continued until the Constitutional Revo­
> lution and was another element in the confusion of motive sur­
> rounding that event.
> The development of Bàbism into Bahâ’ism confirmed the exist­
> ing hostility to the ulama.91 Thus Mïrzà Jànï Kàshànï, author of
> the Nuqtat ul-Kàf, looked forward to the beheading of 70,000
> mullàs by the Hidden Imam on his emergence,92 and thought them
> less valuable than the carcass of a dog.93 The attempt on the life
> on Nâsir ud-Dïn Shah was preceded by a similar plot against the
> imam jum'a of Tehran, which however was not put into operation.
> The Bahà’ïs dissociated themselves from the attack on the Shah,
> 
> 85 Browne, A Year amongst the Persians, p. 608; ‘Abd ul-Husayn Navâ’ï,
> “Hâjj Muhammad Karim Khân Kirmànï,” Yâdgàr, V (1328 Sh/1949-1950), 117.
> 86 Ibid., IV, 72.
> 87 Alessandro Bausani, Persia Religiosa (Milan, 1959), p. 406.
> 88 Jism-i hurqalïyà’ï : “Hurqalyan body,” the subtle body in which the Hidden
> Imam subsists in the realm of Hurqalïyâ, a region intermediate between spirit
> and matter (see Henry Corbin, Terre Celeste et Corps de Résurrection [Paris,
> i960], pp. 99-164).
> 89 Navâ’î, op. cit., IV, 68.
> 90 Shaykh Abû-l-Qâsim Kirmânï, Fihrist-i Kutub-i Marhûm Shaykh Ahmad-i
> Ahsâ’ï va Sâ’ir-i Mashàyikh-i Tzâm (Kirman, 1337 Sh/1958-1959), p. 105.
> 91 Azalism, the other successor to Bàbism, becomes of importance later than
> Bahâ’ism.
> 92 Browne, ed., Târikh-i-Jadid, p. xvii. In one sense, a curious sentiment to
> entertain, for the Bab had claimed precisely to be the Hidden Imam.
> 93 Ibid., p. 15.
> Bâbism, Bahâ’ism, and the Ulama                                         I5I
> 
> and in fact sought to achieve with Nâsir ud-Dïn Shah what the Bâb
> had failed to accomplish with Muhammad Shah: to present them­
> selves as allies of the state against the ulama. ‘Abd ul-Bahâ wrote in
> this vein to Nâsir ud-Dïn Shah.94 Not only was the role of the ulama
> in suppressing Bâbism emphasized, but they were held responsible
> for preventing Nâsir ud-Dïn Shah from introducing a policy of
> toleration.95 The charge was hardly justified; in reality the Bahâ’ïs
> came to occupy something of a position between the state and the
> ulama, not one enabling them to balance the two sides, but rather
> exposing them to blows each side was aiming at the other. The
> government, interested in maintaining order, would resist persecu­
> tion of Bahà’is by the ulama, but would equally, when occasion
> demanded, permit action against the Bahâ’ïs.
> Despite these consequences of the rise of Bâbism, the contradic­
> tion between ulama and state, its origins and its results, remained
> largely unchanged. Not long after the execution of the Bâb, Amïr
> Kabïr expelled the shaykh ul-Islâm and the imâm jum'a from
> Tabriz. Even while Sayyid Yahyà Dârâbï was leading the Bâbï
> insurrection in Nayrïz, a not less violent conflict was raging in Isfa­
> han between clerical and secular power. Bâbism was ultimately no
> more than a side issue in the Qajar history.
> 94 Text and Arabic translation in al-Hasani, op. cit., pp. 132-164.
> 95 Browne, ed.. Traveller’s Narrative, II, 149.
>
> — *Babism, Baha'ism and the Ulama (Used by permission of the curator)*